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ENCLOSURE "B"

discussion

- 1. The term "counterintelligence" pertains to that aspect of intelligence activity relating to all security control measures, both active and passive, designed to insure the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations against the espionage, sabetage or subversive activities of foreign powers and of disaffected or disaffent, indigenous groups or individuals. Counterintelligence, therefore, encompasses such expressions as counter-espionage, counter-sabetage, counter-subversion and security and, in its breadest sense, implies those intelligence procedures and operations directed against the activities of foreign intelligence services and subversive influences which constitute a threat to the security of the national interests.
- 2. The specific functions related to the security of the United States and exercised by federal counterintelligence or security staffs and field agencies, both outside and within the United States and its possessions, are as follows:
 - a. Counter-espionage,
 - b. Counter-sabotage,
 - e. Counter-subversion,
 - d. Internal security control (primarily of passive character and relating to the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations).
 - e. Civil security control (effected for the inhabitants of U. S. occupied, foreign areas).
 - f. Part, frontier and travel security control.
 - g. Consorship.
 - h. Technical counterintelligence services (counterintelligence aspects of secret methods of communication, sabetage materials and techniques, radio direction finding equipment and techniques and similar matters).

- 1. Liaison with the counterintelligence and security services of foreign powers on matters of common interest in furtherance of the national security.
- 8. A survey, conducted by the Central Intelligence Group, has determined that many departments and agencies of the Federal Government are currently charged with the exercise of certain of the counterintelligence functions related to the national security which have been listed in the foregoing paragraph. A tabular presentation of the results of this survey follows:

PEDERAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS

| Department or Agency | Activity | Functions |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| (1) War | (a) G-2 (CI) of | Formulation and supervision of |
| | theater commanders | implementation by the Counter In- |
| | of cocupied areas | telligence Corps of counterintelli- |
| | under War Depart- | gence policies and procedures |
| | ment (Security | designed to secure the national |
| | Group, Office of | interests against foreign espionage, |
| e version de la companya de la comp | Director of Intelli- | sabotage and subversive activities; |
| | gence, W.D.G.S.) | incure civil, port, frontier and |
| · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | en e | travel security control in occupied |
| | | areas; destroy remnants of hostile |
| | | intelligence services and |
| | | affiliated organizations. |
| the state of the s | (b) X-2, SSU | Conduct of residual OSS/SCI or I-2 |
| | 14 | counter-espionage operations (sharply |
| | | limited in scope due to lack of |
| | | personnel); security coverage of |
| | and the Board of | existing SSU/SI operations. |

TABLE I (Continued)

Department or Agency 25X1C Activity

Functions

(2) Havy

(a) Security
Officers of Fleet
and Base commands
under Mavy Department (Domestic
Branch of Office of
Chief of Maval Intelligence, O.C.M.O.)

Formulation and supervision of implementation of naval security control policies and procedures for naval establishments overseas.

(b) Intelligence Group, (Opn Int), Office of ONI, G.G. H.O.

(c) Naval attaches

Preparation and maintenance of research monographs on foreign intelligence services.

Same as military attaches.

(3) State

(a) Chiefs of Missions Coordination of intra-mission accurity matters (currently delegated to SSU/X-2 representative or to Legal Attaché (FBI), if present)

(b) Sefehaven Project Investigation of enemy plans, investments and individual activities designed to preserve their economic, political and military potential abroad after termination of hostilities.

(4) Justice

FBI

Conduct of liaison-type counter-

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TABLE I (Continued)

Department or Agency

Activity

Functions

intelligence operations affecting the internal security of the U.S.; limited largely to Western Hemisphere.

TABLE II

FEDERAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

NITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS

| Department or Agency | As tivi ty | Functions |
|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|
| (1) Justice | (a) FBI | Conduct of investigations of |
| | | espionage, sabotage and related |
| | | matters pertaining to the internal |
| | | security of the U. S. and its |
| | | possessions. (Prosecution of |
| | | offenses against the internal |
| | | security, such as espionage, con- |
| | | duoted by Criminal Division of |
| | | Department of Justice). |
| | (b) Immigration | Security control matters relative |
| | and Maturalisation | to aliens, to include operation |
| | Service | of the Immigration Border Control. |
| (2) War | (a) Security Group, | Formulation and promulgation of |
| | Office of the | War Department counterintelligence |
| | Director of Intelli- | policies and procedures and super- |
| | gence, W.D.G.S.) | vision of their implementation |
| | | within the War Department establish- |
| | | ment. |

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TABLE II (Continued)

| Department or Agency | Activity | <u>Functions</u> |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| | (b) Manhattan | Security of project processes, |
| | District Engineer- | personnel, installations and |
| | ing Project. | activities. |
| (8) Havy | Domestic Branch, | Formulation and promulgation of |
| | Office of the | Navy Department counterintelligence |
| | Chief of Maval | policies and procedures and super- |
| | Intelligence, | vision of their implementation within |
| | o.c.N.O. | the naval establishment. |
| (4) Joint | Joint Security | Formulation and promulgation of |
| Chiefs of | Control. | security control measures related |
| Staff | | to joint Army-Navy-Air operational |
| | top to destruct the second sec | matters. |
| (5) State | (a) Office of | Passport/visa control and the |
| | Controls. | formulation and implementation of |
| | Tarakan da sa | security control policies and |
| en Karakan dan Kabupatèn Kabupatèn | Agenta and the second | procedures relating to departmental |
| en er er er Germanner er er er er er er er er er | tives the second | interests, to include political |
| | | security matters. |
| | (b) Office of | Formulation and implementation of |
| | Reconcis Security | policies and precedures relating to |
| | Policy. | economic security control matters. |
| (6) State- | (a) Subcommittee | Formulation and implementation of |
| War-Navy | for Military In- | national security control policies |
| Coordinating | formation Control. | relating to disclosure of classi- |
| Committee. | | fied military information and |
| | | matériol. |

TABLE II (Continued)

| Department or Agency | Activity | Functions |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | (b) Security Ad- | Formulation of and dissemination |
| | visory Board. | of guidance relating to internal |
| | | security control policies and |
| | | regulations for non-military |
| | | governmental departments or agencies, |
| | | a responsibility discharged during |
| | | the war by the Security Advisory |
| | | Beard of ONI. |
| | | ppas a or one |
| (7) Justice, War | Inter-departmental | Coordination of investigations |
| and Havy | Intelligence | relating to espionage, sounter- |
| | Committee (FBI, MID | espionage and sabotage matters with- |
| | and ONI - established | in the U.S. and its possessions |
| | by Executive Order of | and in the Western Hemisphere. |
| | 26 June 1939.) | |
| | | |
| (8) Treasury | (a) Bureau of | Security control activities incident |
| | Customs. | to the enforcement of customs, |
| | | navigation and other laws and |
| | | regulations concerning international |
| | | traffic erossing the land borders |
| | | and seacoasts of the continental |
| | | U. S. and its principal territories. |
| | (b) Bureau of | Security matters incident to |
| | Narcotics. | narcotic traffic control activities. |
| | (a) Foreign Funds | Limited activities of counterintelli- |
| | Control. | gence character connected with |
| | Antion At + | control of foreign exchange and |
| | | foreign-owned property and of the |
| | | importation or exportation of |
| | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | | domestic currency and securities. |

TABLE II (Continued)

Department or Agency

Activity

Functions

(d) Secret Service

Security of the President and his family and of visiting foreign dignitaries. Counterintelligence aspect of matters concerning counterfeiting of U.S. currency and securities.

(e) Coast Guard

(Mavy in War;

Treasury in peace)

Security control activities incident to enforcement, on navigable waters of U. S., of customs and navigation laws; security control

of merchant seamen.

Mote: It should be appreciated that only those governmental departments and agencies with an established activity charged with functions of counterintelligence nature have been specifically cited above; all governmental departments and agencies are responsible for insuring the internal protection of classified departmental matters against compromise.

4. The survey has further disclosed that a comprehensive, national program providing for the central direction, coordination and supervision of our foreign counterintelligence activities and of the internal security control procedures relative to the safeguarding of information, personnel, equipment and installations of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government has not been established. Evidence of limited coordination of some governmental departments' activities in certain fields of counterintelligence has been found in the existence of the Joint Security Control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Information Control Subcommittee and Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Nevy Coordinating Committee and the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Committee (See Table II above). In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice effects

- some degree of active coordination in the counterintelligence field with the War. Navy and State Departments through the use of limited personnel.

 However, it is emphasized that lack of a comprehensive central coordination of all foreign and domestic counterintelligence procedures and operations has resulted in confused opinions as to jurisdictions of authority, undesirable duplication of effort and absence of an integrated Federal counterintelligence program designed to assist in insuring the security of the national interests.
- 6. Paragraph 1 of the Presidential letter, dated 22 January 1946, designated the National Intelligence Authority as responsible for planning, developing and coordinating all Federal fereign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. Furthermore, paragraph 3b of the Presidential letter charged the Director of Central Intelligence with the responsibility of planning for the coordination of those activities of the intelligence agencies of the National Intelligence Authority which relate to the national security and of recommending to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. Paragraph 1 of this Discussion indicates that counterintelligence activities was an integral part of general intelligence activities.
- that the Director of Central Intelligence is prohibited from exercising police, law enforcement or internal security functions. Therefore, the Central Intelligence Group may not engage in operating functions of this nature; however, it is believed that this prohibition does not imply that the coordination of the fereign counterintelligence operations believed to the national security, with the security operations conducted within the United States and its possessions by appropriate Federal agencies under existing law is forbidden.
 - 7. It is concluded that, in consideration of the facts contained in the

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foregoing Discussion and in order to implement those provisions of the Presidential letter of 22 January 1946 cited in paragraph 5 above, a comprehensive program should be established by the Wational Intelligence Authority which would:

- a. Announce the broad national policies and procedures to govern
 the central direction, occordination and supervision of our foreign
 counterintelligence activities and of the internal security control
 procedures of departments and agencies of the Federal Government which
 relate to the mational security.
- b. Mathlish a central counterintelligence coordination structure, consisting of representatives from appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government, which will be responsible, under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, for discharging functions pertaining to the central coordination of such policies and procedures and for fully effecting appropriate, correlated implementation thereof.

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